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Abstract 
During the last twenty years, the evolution of public policies in Southern countries has been 
characterized by the implementation of liberalization processes, which can be analyzed 
through Douglass North’s institutional change approach. In Costa Rica, liberalization 
processes, that mainly consisted in State withdrawal and frontiers’ opening, led to private 
actors’ empowering and induced different strategic behaviors among rural producers’ 
organizations. In this paper, we carry out a comparative study of four farm sectors (coffee, 
milk, black bean and pineapple), based on a dynamic approach of behaviors in relation with 
institutional changes occuring during the liberalization process. We highlight 
organizations’capacities to adapt and participate to institutional changes by (i) implementing 
economical activities and (ii) acting upon public policies. We underline the fact that rural 
producers organizations play a key role in farm sectors’ efficiency and sustainability, 
permiting both producers’ market insertion (acces to domestic and world markets) and 
political participation (obtention of public suppports). We show that the conditions for success 
of collective action depend on organization’s mental models and organization’s resources 
endowment, and are in line with pathdependent logic. More generally, our study allows us to 
get a better understanding of institutional and economic dynamics. 
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Introduction 
During the last twenty years, the evolution of public policies in Southern countries has been 
characterized by globalization phenomenons, and more specifically by the implementation of 
liberalization processes. These processes can be analyzed in the field of new institutional 
economics, through Douglass North’s institutional change approach. In Costa Rica, 
liberalization processes, that mainly consisted in State withdrawal and in frontiers’ opening,  
can be analyzed as a major institutional change for agricultural activities, that led to private 
actors’ empowering and to a restructuration of farmsectors. Liberalization addresses the 
general issue of producers’ survival and insertion in dynamic markets. In this paper we 
address the issue whether rural producers’ organizations (RPOs thereafter) can guarantee 
producers’ survival in a liberalized environment and insertion in dynamic markets. In the 
economical litterature, this question is mainly addressed by empirical analysis of the way 
producers’ organizations adapt to institutional changes by leading specific economical 
activities. However, little empirical work has been done on the way producers’ organizations 
can in return shape the institutional environment, by leading policy making activities. In this 
paper we analyze both organizations’ participation and adaptation to institutional changes, 
showing that organizations’ economical and policy activities are interdependent and necessary 
to ensure favorable market incentives that would guarantee producers’ insertion in dynamic 
markets.  
To do so, we carry out a comparative study of four farm sectors (coffee, milk, black bean and 
pineapple), based on a dynamic approach of behaviors in relation with institutional changes 
occuring during the liberalization process. We show that under certain conditions, RPOs can 
guarantee producers’ insertion in dynamic markets. In section 1, we highlight 
organizations’capacities to adapt and participate to institutional changes by implementing 
economical activities and acting upon public policies. We analyze the role of RPOs both at 
local and national level, underlying interdependencies between policy-making and 
economical activities. Doing so, we show that RPOs can play a key role in farmsectors’ 
efficiency and sustainability. In section 2, we address the issue of the conditions for RPOs’ 
success in this role. First, we show that RPOs capacities to ensure producers’ insertion in 
dynamic markets depend on their resources endowment and on the way they perceive their 
environment. Then, we show that these factors are directly linked with RPOs’ trajectories, and 
thus are in line with pathdependent logic.  
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Section 1: Rural producers’ organizations as key actors of farmsectors 
In this first section, we analyze the role RPOs are playing in four different farmsectors in 
Costa Rica, highlighting both their economical and policy-making activities. In institutional 
environments each time more subjected to economical liberalization, we show that RPOS can 
guarantee producers’insertion in dynamic markets.  
Rural producers’ organizations and institutional change  
In the literature, importants insights have been made on the way agricultural organizations 
adapt to specific institutional changes. In most of the cases, institutionals changes are taken as 
given, and the analysis deals with the way these changes shape organizations’ activities. 
Institutional changes can correspond generally speaking to economical or trade liberalization 
(Ingco, 1995; Merrman, 1997) or to globalization phenomenons (Reardon, 2000; Ruben and 
ali 2006); more specifically they can equally correspond to economical reforms (McMillan 
and al, 1989; Lin, 1992); to agroindustrialization (Cook, 1995), to the rising importance of 
supermarkets (Reardon and al, 2003; Dries and al, 2004), etc. However, little work has been 
done on the way agricultural organizations’ activities in return can shape the institutional 
change, by modifying their institutional environment.   
Figure 1 : Interactions between institutions and organizations 
 
 
In this paper, interactions between organizations and institutions correpond to our chore 
analytical scheme: we analyze both organizations’ adaptation and participation to institutional 
change. The implications are twofold: first, institutions are considered as endogeneous; 
second, the policy-making activities of the organizations are analyzed. In the paper, we insist 
on policy-making oriented activities as a way to enhance marketing oriented ones. For 
analytical considerations, we distinguish between two types of organizations: “advocacy 
organizations”, that operate at national level on policy making processes  through lobbying 
activities (Pesche, 2006); and “economical organizations”, that in most of the cases operate at 
local level, through production, transformation and marketing activities (Mercoiret and 
Mfou’ou, 2006). This distinction is purely analytical since in  reality, there are important 
overlaps3 between advocacy and economical organizations (Bosc and al, 2001).    
 
                                                 
3
 In some of the cases observed, economical organizations do lead advocacy functions, and advocacy 
organizations do have economical functions.   
Institutional change Organizations’ activities 
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Picture of the evolution of the farmsectors studied 
Farmsectors studied are characterized by different evolution processes, that we describe here 
in terms of numbers of producers, average producers’ market share, and volumes of 
production, exportation and importation. Coffee and pineapple are export products, while 
milk and bean are products traditionally destined to domestic consumption.   
Figure 2 : Evolution of the farm sectors studied 
 Coffee Milk Bean Pineapple 
 1994 2004 1994 2004 1994 2004 1994 2004 
Number of 
producers 
88 662 59 484 9 047 5 200 21 500 6 000 650 3 000 
Producers 
market share 
50 % 35 % 90 % 95 % 100 % 25 % 10 % 20 % 
Production (t) 1 700 859 1 438 539 590 000 610 000 25 707 10 503 545 760 1 963 636 
Exportation (t) 1 530 774 1 294 685 - 57 000 - - 545 760 1 963 636 
Importation (t) - - - - 0 23154 - - 
 
Depending on farm sectors considered, sustainability conditions are different: in the milk and 
pineapple sectors, sustainability is ensured (expansion dynamic), while in the bean and coffee 
sectors sustainability is threatened (crisis dynamic). Our point is that these differences can 
partly be accounted for differences, between farmsectors, in organizations’ economical and 
policy-making activities. In the next two subsections, we show that RPOs can play a key role 
in farm sectors’ sustainability, permiting both producers’ market access (both to domestic and 
world markets) and policy making participation (obtaining public suppports). Despite a 
general evolution towards a wider liberalization, some farmsectors still benefit from important 
public supports: we relate these supports with collective action processes occuring inside the 
farm sectors but also to policy changes (pineapple sector).   
Rural producers’ organizations economical role 
We use Williamson’s governance structure concept to describe the mechanisms of economical 
coordination prevailing in each one of the farmsectors studied : these structures include 
markets, hierarchies and hybrid (Williamson, 1996). For each farmsector, we characterize 
governance structures currently prevailing, and describe more precisely the role RPOs are 
playing in these structures. A first observation (see Figure3) leads us to a double statement :  
- The governance structures prevailing differ a lot from one farmsector to one another 
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- In each one of the farmsectors, RPOs do play a role in the coordination of economical 
activities. This role can recover different degrees of importance from one farmesctor to one 
another.  
Figure 3 : Governance structures currently prevailing in each one of the farm sectors studied 
 Coffee Milk Bean Pineapple 
Main governance structure Hybrid Hierarchy Market  Hierarchy 
Other governance structure Hierarchy Hybrid Hybrid Market, hybrid 
RPOs’ market share 35 % 95 % 10 % 15 % 
 
Considering sustainability, we must also consider related issues as (i) risk and vulnerability, 
and  (ii) new norms compliance requirements, mostly but not exclusively in international 
markets. To what extent can RPOs help to reduce risks and adapt to norms’ evolution? As 
pineapple, milk needs a tight management to avoid health hazards; plus, pineapple must 
comply with European and US quality standards for fresh products (Faure and Samper, 2006); 
while coffee must cope with new quality norms (differentiated product). We observe that even 
if it may not be exclusive, in these three sectors we find hierarchical modes of governance. To 
some extent, hierarchies correspond to the existence of dominant stakeholders within 
farmsectors: we will consider later the cases of CoopeDosPinos in milk, of national firms in 
coffee, and of multinationals firms in pineapple.       
Coffee is one of the oldest agricultural productions in Costa Rica. Production is ensured by a 
large basis of small producers that historically did play an important role in the construction 
of the democratic Costarician State (Peters and Samper 2001). In comparison to other 
producing countries, coffee sector in Costa Rica is characterized by a relatively low level of 
integration. Indeed, since its inception, coffee production was mainly the fact of small scale 
farmers selling cherries to beneficiadores scattered in the central Meseta (Sfez, 2001). This 
initially low level of integration partially accounts to explain current governance structure. 
Economical activities are mainly ruled by hybrid structures, based on the existence of 
contracts between producers and cooperatives (or private firms), and between cooperatives (or 
private firms) and exporters connected to foreign importers in consumers countries. In the last 
ten years, due to an international deregulation, coffee prices are declining, despite the 
existence of a national regulation system (Diaz, 2003). Confronted to this crisis situation, 
cooperatives, that mostly emerged in the 1930s and consolidated in the 1960s, are slightly 
loosing importance in terms of market share after a deep management crisis that engaged the 
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movement in a profound restructuring during the 1990s; on the contrary, private firms, who 
tend to vertically integrate the production function, giving rise to hierarchy structures, are 
gaining importance. Some cooperatives also follow this strategy.  
Figure 4 : Economical structuration of the coffee sector 
Milk production in Costa Rica corresponds to a reduced number of producers who tend to 
increase their acreage and to specialize: recent evolution is characterized by sensible 
productivity gains (SEPSA, 2002). Hierarchy is the most important governance structure, that 
mainly corresponds to a producers’ organization, called CoopeDosPinos, that emerged in the 
1950s, and progressively vertically integrated the entire milk sector, from production inputs to 
distribution (Melendez, 1998).  
Figure 5 Economical structuration of the milk sector 
transformation
production
exportation
Coffee producer
Cooperative 
(transformation, 
exportation)
35%
Private firm
(production, 
transformation, 
exportation)
65%
Consumer (USA, EU)
Hierarchy Contract
transformation
production
distribution
Milk producer
Coop. 
Dos 
Pinos
85%
Consumer
Private 
firm 5%
Hierarchy (vertical integration)Contract
Other
coop. 
10%
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CoopeDosPinos producers tend to have larger exploitation surfaces than others (who deliver 
to smaller cooperatives or to private firms): with only 1380 producers (27% of the producers 
in Costa Rica), CoopeDosPinos practically holds the monopoly on milk domestic market. 
This position would not have been possible without the existence of a system of high import 
tariff that totally protect milk domestic market. In the last ten years, CoopeDosPinos has been 
reinforcing its economical weight, developping exportations towards North and Centro- 
American markets.   
 
Bean is one of the elements of the costarician staple diet. Traditionally, its production has 
been ensured by an extended number of small producers (Dioniso, 1991). Up to 1994, for 
self-sufficiency arguments, bean production has been supported by important public 
programs: prices were subsidied and the Ministry of Agriculture was in charge of cleaning, 
packeting and distribution operations. At that time, bean producers had no uncertainty to cope 
with, and there were no RPOs in bean sector. Nevertheless, State withdrew in 1995 from 
direct support, which led to a strong declining of the activity, and to the disappearance or 
reorientation of many small producers (Salazar, 2003). Currently, in the bean sector, 
economical exchanges are essentially ruled by market laws: most of the bean consumed is 
imported trough private firms (this is encouraged by a very low import tariff), and even the 
bean produced in Costa Rica is mostly bought without any kind of vertical structure or 
contract. Producers’ organizations, recently emerged, are trying to establish contracts with 
private firms but these contracts tend to be misrespected and reduced each year.   
Figure 6 : Economical structuration of the bean sector 
production
distribution
Bean producer    
(Costa Rica)
Private firms (transformation, 
distribution)
Contract
Foreign producer
75%
Market
Intermediary 
15% Organization
10%
Consumer
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Pineapple is quite recent in Costa Rica as a significant export crop: its production for export 
rises dramatically (MAG, 2004).  This recent and rapid development is related to the 
installation, mid 80s-early 90s, of multinational firms (Quesada, 1999), supported by 
important public programs (that ended up in 1999). In the late ten years, the movement has 
been followed by the re-orientation of many producers towards pineapple production 
(Veerabadren, 2004). In the 90s, multinational firms extended their packing and exportation 
functions to production functions, thus vertically integrating the entire sector: these private 
hierarchical forms still correspond to the prevailing governance structure. However, they are 
nowadays slightly loosing relative economical weight (and indeed their position of “unique” 
stakeholder), due to : (i) the recent emergence of producers’ organizations that gives rise to 
hybrid structures (or even to collective hierarchy structures) ; and (ii) the dynamism of the 
activity that favors market’s funcionning (non respect of contracts by producers).  
Figure 7 : Economical structuration of the pineapple sector 
 
 
Rural producers’ organizations do have a specific importance in the coordination of 
economical activities, but the degree of importance differs from one farm sector to one 
another (ranging from 10% of market share in the bean sector to 95% in the milk sector). 
Furthermore, this degree has been evoluating through time, revealing different adaptive 
capacities:  
production
distribution
Pineapple producer
Consumer (USA, EU)
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- In the coffee sector, producers’ cooperatives are relatively loosing importance, thus 
showing weaker adaptive capacities than private firms to the international prices crisis 
and new requirements to gain market shares (organic, shade, origin based, fairtrade 
coffees…)   
- In the milk sector, the main producers’ cooperative maintains its monopolistic 
position, leaving very little space to private firms. 
- In the bean sector, recently created producers’ organizations suffer from the 
development of importations, showing important difficulties to face the liberalized 
situation.  
- In the pineapple sector, newborn producers’ organizations reinforce their economical 
position (sometimes challenging multinational private firms), revealing strong 
adaptive capacities.  
Rural producers’ organizations policy making role 
Now, let’s consider the specific public policies that apply to the different farmsectors. The 
situations differ widely: milk and coffee sectors still benefit from important public supports 
that protect them from liberalization (regulation of coffee prices, high milk import tariffs); 
when bean and pineapple4 sectors have been fully liberalized (State withdrawal, frontiers 
opening). These differences can be accounted for differences, inside farmsectors, of collective 
action on policy making processes. For each farmsector, we analyze these processes by 
presenting the advocacy organizations at stake and describing their behavior. We qualify 
behaviors as pro-active when the organization is directly lobbying at the right policy space (ie 
where the final decision is taken) and is defending its position on the basis of its proper policy 
proposal. Except for the case of pineapple sector (where only big producers’ interests are 
defended), all of the sectors do have advocacy RPOs (see Figure 8). In the milk and coffee 
sector, these RPOs are quite always obtaining benefits from their policy participation, which 
is hardly the case in the bean sector, where industrials interests are prevailing in policy 
negociations.   
                                                 
4
 The pineapple case symbolizes policy implemented during the Structural Adjustment Programs, known as 
“agricultura de cambio” ( pineapple is a typical product of agricultural diversification oriented to export 
markets). Surprisingly its development, until 1999, brought together free market orientation with multinational 
heading the game and at the same time public policy support, through exportation subsidies. After a period of 
strong opposal to the public supports received by multinational firms (exports subsidies, fiscal advantages), from 
national farmers unions and from a few civil servants, the exports susbsidies system has been abolished. The 
nowadays public support has been much reduced, and consists in extension programs for small scales farmers. 
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Figure 8 : Policy making process at stake in each one of the farmsectors studied 
 Coffee Milk Bean Pineapple 
Public support obtained  
 
High price 
regulation 
High market 
protection  
Low market 
protection 
Lobby at European 
Union 
Advocacy organizations 3 organizations: 
-Producers (1) 
-Industrials (1) 
-Exportators (1) 
Strong 
coordination  
1 organization  
 
 
 
Strong 
coordination  
17 organizations:  
-Producers (16) 
-Industrials (1) 
 
Low 
coordination 
1 organization  
(big producers and 
exportators) 
 
Strong 
coordination 
Producers’ 
organizations’ behavior 
Pro-active Pro-active Defensive  - 
Other organizations’ 
behaviours 
Pro-active 
(national firms) 
- Pro-active 
(national firms) 
Pro-active (multi-
national firms) 
 
In the coffee sector, the main policy stake is to protect the activity from international prices 
crisis, by regulating national prices.  Since the beginning of the XXth century, producers do 
benefit from such an internal regulation, which used to protect them from international prices’ 
variations (Diaz, 2003).  Gaining public supports has traditionally been ruled by the constant 
interplay of three advocacy organizations : the National Federation of Coffee Cooperatives, 
the National Chamber of Coffee Growers; and the National Chamber for Coffee Exportators 
that represent both producers’, industrials’ and exportators’ interests (Chaves, 2000). This 
interplay takes place inside the Coffee Institute, created in 1933. The usual process begins 
with a proposition phase from one of the three political organizations (if originated by the 
producers’ organization, this proposition results from a consultation process with the 
members of local coffee cooperatives), followed with a dialogue phase between the three 
organizations and the State (within the Coffee Institute), that ends with an internal decision, 
ruled by a system of representative vote, and usually validated by the legislative power 
(Legislative Assembly).  
Domestic milk market has always been supported in Costa Rica: by a price fixation system 
that ended up in 1999 (Montero, 2004); and by an importation limitation systems, that shifted 
from a quota system to a tariff system in 1995. The obtention of these important policy 
supports is directly linked with the activities of the National Chamber of Milk Producers and 
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Industrials, since its creation in 1962. The policy making process is usually originated with 
the elaboration of a proposition by the Chamber (that has been elaborated through a 
consultation process with milk cooperatives and private firms), and directly goes trough a 
negociation phase with the executive power where the Chamber directly defends milk sector’s 
position. At present, the policy instruments at stake are import tariffs, directly negotiated 
between representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Trade and international trade experts 
from the National Chamber of Milk and from the CoopeDosPinos. The Chamber’s policy 
influence is reinforced by the economic weight of CoopeDosPinos and by the personal ties 
existing between representants of the executive power and of CoopeDosPinos5.    
In the bean sector, from the producer’s point of view, the main policy stake is to defend 
domestic production conditions from importations, acting on tariff levels, just as in the case of 
milk sector. The policy making process is ruled by interactions between a myriad of small 
scale producers’ organizations, the industrials’ organization and the State, represented by 
different Ministries. Producers are represented by (i) an average of 15 locally based marketing 
organizations, not specialized in lobbying activities, and by (ii) national farmers’ unions that 
generally protest against State withdrawal from direct production support, without specifically 
defending bean producers’ interests (revendicative actions).  On the other hand, industrials are 
represented by a profesional organization, that has rather good capacities for elaborating 
apropriate policy proposals (high level of knowledge in international trade issues, good 
tecnical abilities to analyse economical situations and to formulate policy proposals), and is 
obtaining satisfying public supports. At the beginning of the process, in 1995, there was no 
dialogue platform.  Nowadays, the National Bean Commission, created in 2003, functions as a 
dialogue structure, constituted by producers’ organizations, industrials’ organization and 
representants from the Ministry of Agriculture. Discussions are based on the proposals made 
by the industrials’ organization, and lead to internal decisions. However, the final policy 
decision often differs from this internal decision. Indeed, the final tariff decision is taken by 
the Ministry of Foreign Trade, and results from a negociation process where the industrials’ 
organization directly participates, but where RPOs are not present. This exclusion of RPOs 
can be explained by an erroneous perception of pertinent policy platforms6. In many of the 
                                                 
5
 We found close relationships between members from the Administrative Council of CoopeDosPinos and 
representants of the executive power. Indeed, some of the members of the Administrative Council were in charge 
of governement strategic positions (Minister of Economy, Minister of Finance...) 
6
 Having participating to a previous dialogue phase where State is represented trough the Ministry of 
Agriculture, and having obtained a formal decision resulting from a direct discussion with industrials (thus 
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cases, the final decision deserves producers’ interests and differs from the decision taken into 
the National Bean Commission (mix between producers’ and industrials’ interests).   
The pineapple sector’s situation is quite different from the others and indeed quite interesting:  
after a confusing period where firms received huge national public supports7, the policy 
making process is nowadays directed towards the international level, and regards European 
Commission policies (and not anymore national policies as in the three other cases). There is 
a single advocacy organization, the National Chamber of Pineapple Producers and 
Exportators, created recently, that represents both big producers’ and exportators’ interests 
(small producers’ interests correspond to specific problems and are not represented). The 
lobbying activities of the National Pineapple Chamber consist in: elaborating political 
proposals (basically, tariff levels), discussing these proposals at a national level, and bringing 
them at the international level with the national public support obtained.  The main objective 
of the Chamber is to convince enough at the national level to obtain major support at 
international level. To do so, the Chamber regularly mobilizes high level policy actors such 
as: the President of the Republic; experts from Foreign Trade and External Relations 
Ministries; deputies from the Legislative Assembly; ambassadors from European countries, 
and delegates from European Commission in Costa Rica.    
In each one of the case studied, the policy making process involves a serie of policy proposals 
and decisions. In three of the cases studied, the final decision, negociated with executive or 
legislative bodies, corresponds to the decision obtained by a dialogue between advocacy 
organizations. In the bean case however, there is a disjuncture between the final decision 
                                                                                                                                                        
representing a intermediary position between producers and industrials interests), RPOs’ leaders may think 
producers’ interests have been defended, and their position has been enough clarified. Bean RPOs’ perception is 
erroneous for two main reasons : (i) the real policy decision is taken elsewhere, by the Ministry of Foreigh 
Trade; and (ii) outside of the National Bean Comission, the Ministry of Agriculture is not really defending 
producers’ interests. This erroneous perception of bean RPOs has much to see with the paternalist relation the 
Ministry of Agriculture had with bean procucers for more than 40 years. Indeed, the National Bean Comission is 
sort of a “masquerade”: producers do have the sensation that they could access a real policy dialogue, but in 
reality they stay excluded from the real policy process.  
7
 Between 1984 and 1999, within the “Agricultura de Cambio” program, numerous multinational firms benefited 
from public supports through systems of exports subsidies and fiscal advantages. These public supports were the 
results of lobbying actions leaded by the influent Chamber for Exportators. The policy actions of the Chamber 
for exportators are multisectorial : they gave rise to sectorial advocacy organizations (cases of pineapple, melon, 
flower, watermelon, tubercules…).   
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(between 1 and 40% import tariff, that serves industrials interests), and the one obtained in the 
Commission (between 40 and 70%, that serves both industrials’ and producers’ interests).  
Figure 9 : Correspondance between preliminary and final political decisions  
 Political 
instrument  
Decision 1 
(dialogue) 
Decision 2 
(negociation) 
Correspondance between 
decisions 1 and 2 
Coffee Price 
regulation 
Coffee Institute Legislative 
Assembly 
Yes: establishment of a coffee 
price regulation fund 
Milk Import 
tariff 
National Milk 
Chamber 
Ministry of 
Foreign Trade 
Yes: establishment of a high 
import tariff  
Bean Import 
tariff 
National Bean 
Commission 
Ministry of 
Foreign Trade 
No: establishment of a low 
import tariff  
Pineapple EU import 
tariff 
National Pineapple 
Chamber 
European 
Commission 
Yes: suppression of the 
european import tariff 
 
These observations reveal strong complementarities between policy-making and economical 
activities of RPOs that do matter on producers’ insertion in dynamic markets. Indeed, the well 
economical funcioning of these markets is directly dependent of policy decisions : public 
supports obtained by advocacy RPOs serve as market incentives (creation of protected 
economical environments), and enhance economical RPOs’ activities. If both policy-making 
and economical activities are determinant, it appears however that, during the historical 
process of structuration of the farmsectors studied, economical RPOs came first. In the long 
run, our analysis highlights strong interactions between economic oriented organizations and 
policy making oriented organizations.  As organizations they are not closed entities since 
individuals (members) constitue an organic link between them in the same way they do it 
between professional organizations and administration and political bodies.   
Figure 10 : Emergence of economical and advocacy RPOs in Costa Rica 
RPOs Coffee Milk Bean Pineapple 
Economical organizations  1900s 1947 1995 1990s 
Advocacy organizations 1930s 1962 - 2003 
 
In this section, we underlined the key role RPOs can play in farmsectors, permiting both 
producers’ market insertion and policy-making participation. Doing so, we highlighted 
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organizations’ capacities to adapt and participate to institutional changes. We explained the 
fact that some sectors were characterized by a relative institutional continuity (milk and coffee 
cases), while others were characterized by situations of institutional shocks (bean case8) by 
the way organizations were participating to policy making processes and obtaining (or not) 
policy measures that would protect them from liberalization.  
Furthermore, we saw in this section that policy and economical weights of RPOs differ 
considerably: in the coffee, milk and pineapple sectors, both RPOs economical and policy 
influence are important – even if RPOs in pineapple sector are still young in terms of 
experience9; while in the bean sector RPOs influence is much lower (very low market share 
and reduced lobbying power). The analysis we made on the basis of the empirical material 
collected indicates relations between the intensity of the economic coordination and the 
influence in policy making process.  A stakeholder’s dominant economic position in the value 
chain (pineapple, milk) corresponding to hierarchical coordination is associated with a strong 
influence in policy making. We may extend this to coffee sector but to a lesser extent due to 
less concentration of economic power which in turn is compensated by stronger ties between 
sector professionals and political personal. In section two, we seek to understand these 
differences by analyzing the conditions under what RPOs succeed in ensuring producers’ 
insertion in domestic and international markets.  
 
 
Section 2: Conditions of rural producers organizations’ success  
We analyze the reasons why RPOs could fail or succeed in implementing policy-making or 
economical activities. In the litterature, authors insist on different factors that influence 
organizations results: these factors can refer to the environment of the organization (Handy, 
1999; Stockbridge, 2003), to individuals that are part of the organization (Olson 1978; Hardin 
1982; Nabli and Nugent 1990), or to the organization itself (Olson 1978; Cook 1995, Staatz 
1989; Handy 1999).  
Analytical scheme, data collection and analysis 
Most of the economical studies deal with the factors of success without analysing directly the 
determinants of organizations’ choices made. We focus on the organization’s characteristics 
                                                 
8
 The bean case illustrates the fact that organizations’ adaptive capacities need time to be constructed and are the 
result of complex learning processes.  
9
 Considering only the organization per se, appreciation may be different considering the individuals that may 
reveal deep experience acquired in other organization 
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that are potentially important to understand the choices made, and, at the end, the results 
obtained by the organizations. We describe these characteristics as follows:  
- Resources’ endowment, as suggested in the management litterature (Penrose 1979, 
Wernerfelt 1984). According to the resource based view, the heterogeneity of resources 
between firms lead to heterogeneous results; and the resources a firm owns result from long 
lasting learning processes. According to the authors, resources are classified in different ways: 
tangible or not (Penrose 1979); individuals or organizational (Grant 1991), physical, human 
and financial (Barney 1997). We choose to distinguish between financial, technical and 
human resources. 
- Trajectories and experiences, considering them as a kind of “historical resource” 
(Nugent 1993).  We consider both individual and collective histories since they are closely 
interconnected: individuals with their own personal experiences form the basis of collective 
action processes. In return, organizations with the rules they establish and pursue, shape 
individuals’ behaviours to achieve a common goal, thus gaining collectively a set of 
individual new experiences.  
- Mental perceptions of the leaders, concerning their environment (Nabli and Nugent, 
1990; North 1990).  We use the concept of mental model, as defined by Denzau and North in 
1994 : “internal representations that individul cognitive systems create to interpret the 
environment” (Denzau and North, 1994, p3). Mental models can be considered as a king of 
“cognitive resource” that influences strategic choices (Nadoulek, 1992). The way these mental 
models determine individual or collective choices and, at the end, the evolution of societies, 
has been wisely emphasized: “mental models guide choices and shape the evolution of 
political and economical systems” (Denzau and North, 1994). More particularly, North 
emphasized the way cognition shapes institutions: “belief systems are the internal 
representation and institutions the external manifestation of that representation” (North, 
2005, p 49).   
In the following subsection we test the relation of these organizations’ characteristics with the 
results obtained by the organizations. The results have been evaluated by the construction of 
indicators: in the case of marketing oriented RPOs, we took into account elements basically 
related to the amount and stability of the profits obtained; and in the case of advocacy 
oriented RPOs, we took into account elements related to the degree of participation of the 
RPO and to the final decision obtained.  
The data collection, realized between November 2006 and February 2007 in Costa Rica, 
consisted in open and guided interviews with organizations’ leaders and representative from 
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executive and legislative bodies. The data obtained are both qualitative10 and quantitative11. 
At the end, 25 cases of organizations were analyzed: 12 organizations were more policy-
making oriented (acting at national level), and 13 were more marketing oriented (acting at 
local level). The data analysis consisted in three distinct phases.  
- An analytical description. To conduct our comparative case studies (Yin, 1994), this 
method has been widely used to present collected material data such as actors’ trajectories, 
interpersonal and interorganizational relations, policy making and marketing processes…   
- A statistical analysis of textual data. This method has been used to assess the relation 
between the way organizations’ leaders where perceiving their environment and the way they 
were behaving in that environment, analyzing leaders’ speeches. The innovation basicaly 
consists in making a quantitative treatement of qualitative data. Textual analysis developped 
in the 1980s, and relies on a starting hypotesis that the words emploied by the actors refer to 
“mental schemes” that can be clarified (Reinert 1986). Lexicometric analysis is a mix 
between content analysis and cognitive mapping: it enables both a quantitative definition of 
lexical specificity (by establishing lexical classes composed by representative words) and a 
production of qualitative structural information (by analyzing in the classes the relations 
between the most representative words). We will not present here into detail the results 
obtained with this method, and rather stick to very rough categories (for further details see 
Maître D’Hôtel and Chabaud, 2006, to be published).  
- Partial least square modeling. To answer the theoretical issue “do mental models matter 
on behaviours?” we wanted to measure the influence of both “classical determinants” of the 
behavior (as resources, experience…) and “non classical determinants” of the behavior (as 
mental models) on the results obtained by the organizations12. We were not able to use linear 
regression because (i) our observations number was too reduced, and (ii) explanatory 
variables could be correlated. Thus, we oriented towards partial least square techniques 
(Hulland, 1999), often referred as “soft modelling”, because there is few distribution 
assumptions and few observations suffice (Tenenhaus and al, 2005).  
 
                                                 
10
 For example : points of view, trajectories, relations, network insertion, knowledge, technical abilities… 
11
 For example : financial resources, economical results, members participation… 
12
 The textual analysis’s results revealed a direct correspondance between mental models and behaviors, which 
could seem intuitive (and even tautologic). We wanted to go further and to determine if the fact to take into 
account mental models as an explanatory variable in the analysis of behaviors would permit to better understand 
these behaviors (better than with the classical variables only).  
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Results presentation 
In this subsection, we first give a brief analysis of organizations’ characteristics before 
assessing the relations existing between these characteristics and the results obtained by the 
organizations. The analytical description is coherent with the huge variation in resources 
endowment observed for RPOs between each farm sectors. A rapid observation at Figure 11 
seems to indicate that the higher the experience, the higher the resources endowment 
(generally speaking), which is intuitive with the existence of learning processes that permit 
organizations a progressive construction of resources and capacities.  
Figure 11 : RPOs experience and resources’ endowment 
Coffee Milk Bean Pineapple RPOs 
Eco Po Eco Po Eco Po Eco Po 
Experience (years) 108 74 60 45 12 - 20 4 
Technical abilities + + + + + + + + + + + + + - + + + + + 
Financial capacities + - + + + + - - + + + + 
Human resources + + + + +  + + + + + + + - + + + + +  
 
During the interviews, RPOs’leaders were invited to talk about their respective perceptions of 
their own farmsector situations for economical RPOs’ leaders and of policy making processes 
for advocacy RPOs’ ones. On the basis of their discourses, we conducted a statistical analysis 
of textual data using the Alceste software.  The results indicate that from one farmsector to 
one another, leaders perceive their environment quite diferently13.  Mental models seem to 
converge within each of the farmsectors (relative proximity of leaders’ speeches). In the case 
of policy-making RPOs, the policy making process can be seen as:  
- an opportunity to defend ones interests (coffee, milk and pineapple leaders) 
- a real constraint (bean leaders).  
In the case of economical RPOs, leaders tend to focus more on different coordination 
mechanisms:  
- organizations (coffee and milk leaders) 
- State (bean leaders) 
- market (pineapple leaders).  
                                                 
13
 Partly, this result accounts for differences between environments, and partly for differences in mental schemes 
(a same environment can be perceived differently).   
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Now, moving to the analysis of the way organizations’ characteristics (experience, financial, 
technical and human resources, mental models) are influencing their strategic choices, it 
appears that these characteristics do influence RPOs choices in different ways.   
Figure 12 : Partial Least Square results 
 Advocacy RPOs Economical RPOs 
Characteristics Explanatory variables Coefficient Explanatory variables Coefficient 
Experience Age -0,02 Age -0,01 
Proposal abilities 0,09 * Universitary degree 0,17 * Technical 
resources Knowledge 0,04 Permanent formation 0,12 * 
Financial capacities 0,05 External support 0,02 Financial 
resources Financial specificity  0,20 * Investment capacity 0,22 * 
Personal imbrications 0,21 * Publicnetworkinsertion -0,15 * 
Support from the basis 0,14 * Privatenetworkinsertion 0,16 * 
Human 
resources 
Representativity 0,06 * Members participation 0,08 * 
Opportunity 0,07 * Market 0,09 * 
Constraint -0,06 * Organization 0,06 * 
Mental 
models 
  State -0,16 * 
 
The partial least square results14, established on the relations between different sets of 
characteristics (mental models, experience, and resources endowment) and organizations’ 
results show that:  
- “Experience” does not have any significant direct effect on organization’s results. 
However, tests made to assess the existence of relations between the variable experience and 
variables related to “resources” and to “mental models” show that “Experience” has a positive 
significant indirect effect on organizations’ results.  
- Mental models do have a direct effect on organizations’ results. In the case of advocacy 
RPOs, perceiving the policy making process as an oportunity to defends ones interests has a 
significant positive influence on the results obtained. In the case of economical RPOs, directly 
                                                 
14
 Each one of the explanatory variables does have a relation with the variable to be explained, materialized by 
the normalized coefficient. However, this coefficient can not be interpreted directly, but trough a ranking of the 
variables in an order of importance (absolute value of the coefficient). The interpretation process requires to 
retain only the variables presenting the most important coefficients in absolute value.  For arbritrary reasons, we 
only considered the variables with a coefficient higher than 0,05 in absolute value.  
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enhancing the role of the State in the farmsector situation has a significative negative 
influence on the results obtained. In bean sector, RPOs’ leaders take State withdrawal as 
responsible for producers’ difficulties; whereas in milk, coffee and pineapple sectors, leaders 
think the activities leaded by RPOs are much more determinant in term of contribution to the 
sector’s development than the public programs the State could have implemented (even when 
they acknowledge the importance of public programs, leaders do attribute the obtention of 
these programs to their actions).    
- Resources’ endowment does have a direct effect on organizations’ results. This effect 
is somehow varying according (i) to the type of resources and (ii) to the kind of activities. In 
the case of advocacy RPOs, human and technical resources are much more determinant than 
financial ones (positive influence of personal ties with executive and legislative powers, 
support from the basis, tecnical abilities). In the case of economical RPOs, financial and 
tecnical resources are both important (positive influence of financial capacities, universitary 
degree, permanent formation); when human resources can play an ambiguous role (positive 
influence of private network insertion, but negative influence of public network insertion).  
Organizations’ characteristics such as resources’ endowment and mental perceptions do have 
a direct effect on organizations’s results (in the case of advocacy organizations as in the case 
of economical organizations). Experience does have an indirect effect on organizations’ 
results, through the constitution of resources and perceptions, as represented on Figure13. 
Figure 13 : Indirect and direct measured effects  
 
The indirect effect of “experience” appeals for explanations in term of learning. 
Organizations’ 
strategic choices 
and results
Mental models 
(leader’s perception of the 
environment)
Tecnical resources 
-tecnical abilities 
-knowledge
Financial resources 
(financial capacities)
Human resources 
-network insertion 
-members’ support 
Experience
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- In coffee and milk sectors, RPOs count with a long history of collective action, and 
their leaders and members have been used to behave in a very active way, directly 
participating both to the definition of specific public policies (through the constitution 
advocacy organizations), and to the economical structuration of the sectors (through the 
constitution of cooperatives). These long lasting activities allowed organizations to get good 
knowledge and analytical skills, to consolidate their human networks since personal ties 
between actors in these two sectors and both high level civil servants and the government 
members are important. It also shaped their mental perceptions so that they formulate choices 
that perfectly fit the institutional environment they contributed to design (good adaptive and 
participative capabilities).  
- In the bean sector, organizations emerged recently, in reaction to State withdrawal: 
they are composed by farmers who were used in the past to get public support from the State 
without having to participate to its elaboration15 and even without having to worry about 
marketing their production. This situation partly explains the difficulties encountered by bean 
RPOs to face a liberalized environment, their lower level of resources and their somewhat 
“inadequate” mental models (low adaptive capabilities). However, the case RPOs in the bean 
sector is a good illustration of the dynamic of a learning process: in 1995, RPOs assisted 
(without having any resource that would have permitted them to participate satisfully) to the 
fixation of an import tariff of 1%. Today, RPOs do have a higher level of resources (in terms 
of analytical capacities, networking…) and participate to the policy making process, obtaining 
higher levels of tariff protection (now up to 40%).  That means that bean organizations have 
shifted in ten years from a inexperienced attitude towards policies to a more active and better 
targeted one that enable them to defend in a more accurate way the domestic production. This 
ten years evolution situation seems consistent with literature (North 1990, p 45), and reveal an 
interesting “delay adjustment”.  
- The case of pineapple sector is more complex. RPOs, although recenlty emerged, 
showed rather good adaptive capacities to face a liberalized environment. To explain this 
situation, we need to analyze both organizational capacities and individual capacities. In term 
of organizational capacities, technical factors matter a lot since there is a shift from 
production done my multinationals to production by individual producers and a specific role 
                                                 
15
 Some bean RPOs’ leaders had participated to land conflicts in the 1970s-1980s and leaded revendicative 
actions targeted against the State (one single dominant actor).  However, the experience they get from these 
revendicative actions was not adapted to situations of multi-actors negociation where the capacity to elaborate 
proposal admissible for the other actors has became strategic.  
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for RPOs in getting the product right.  In term of individual capacities, pineapple RPOs’ 
leaders are highly educated individuals who are rather well introduced in policy and 
economical networks, who have flourishing businesses (the main stakeholders are North-
american firms, producing and exporting to North-america), who defend entreprenarial vision. 
As an example, the leader of the National Chamber for Pineapple Producers and Exporters (i) 
has been for ten years the leader of the Chamber for Exporters, a very powerful advocacy 
organization in Costa Rica, that obtained in the 90s important public supports (exports 
subsidies and fiscal advantages); and has managed for twenty years banana exploitations, 
before diversifying his activities towards pineapple exploitation. This example suggests how 
an organization can benefit from its leaders’ personal trajectory and how this trajectory 
implies capacities’ building, by the acquisition of knowledge and analytical skills, and by the 
construction of close interpersonal ties with administrative officials and government 
members. 
Pathdependency 
Our elements indicate that « history matters » (North, 1990) but we would like to go a little 
further following an approach proposed by Pierson (2000) in his attempt to formalize the path 
dependence in its narrow version16, to answer the question why history matters so vitally. 
Factors that lead to pathdependency 
From our empirical material, we try to identify the core determinants at work to explain path 
dependence processes putting “time horizons” in our economic picture to understand better 
institutional continuity and the specific role of RPOs. Among the factors identified in the 
literature, we propose to consider both technical and economical determinants on one side and 
institutional and political ones on the other side, since we adopted this unsatisfactory 
categorization of RPOs in this paper. The first set of factors focus on the technical content and 
constraints linked to the products along with their specific processing that widely vary 
according to the type of market targeted. They refer explicitly to coordination and learning 
phenomenons (North 1990, Arthur 1994; Pierson 2000, Mahoney 2001): institutions create 
mutually consistent expectations that permit easier coordination of behaviors (Arthur 1994; 
David 1994), that reinforce habits (Nelson and Winter 1982; Hodgson 1998), and that 
increase return costs (Pierson, 2000). The second set of factors deals with power 
                                                 
16In its broader version, pathdependence is close to the “history matters” formula and means that “what 
happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occuring at a later 
point in time” (Sewell 1966, quoted from Pierson 2000).  
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considerations: institutions reveal a specific distribution of power and wealth in a society 
(Bardhan, 2001), and thus tend to favour specific groups and organizations that have interest 
in maintaining status quo (Mahoney 2001, North 2005). It also embraces policy making 
considerations since the collective nature of politics (Pierson, 2000) and “institutional 
thickness” influences the path dependent nature of institutional change. Between these two 
broad categories of factors we find the learning process which is inherent to any collective 
action. It involves cognition phenomena: path dependence arises from the way cognition 
evolves (Denzau and North 1994, Egidi 1997, North 2005), and from the fact perceptions 
evolve slowly, trough complex learning processes (North 1990; Hodgson 1998). These 
different factors interact and allow a better understanding of institutional change and path 
dependant phenomena we observed in Costa Rica.  We will refer to coffee and milk sectors 
since their trajectories along the XXth century allow considerations about RPOs role in path 
dependent process.  We will add some comments drawing lessons from more recent 
institutional changes in pineapple and bean sectors since we cannot talk about historical depth 
in these cases.    
The technical dimension and the related costs permit to understand the institutional continuity 
observed in the cases of milk and coffee.   
- High fixed costs. With different technical constraints, both milk and coffee 
experience processing requirements that orient strongly the next step forward. Cold chain and 
the related process of dairy products in milk case, and the treatment of fresh coffee in coffee 
case imply high investments and tehnical skills for RPOs (furthermore, standards evolve 
rapidly in these two sectors). 
-  High coordination effects. The prevailing economical mechanisms do have long 
roots (governance structures), and RPOs rely on these mechanisms partly because it is less 
costly than implementing new ones (people get used to one kind of coordination). On the 
contrary, in the bean sector, producers have been used for a period of 40 years to receive 
direct public support, and when faced to State withdrawal, it was very costly for them to 
construct new mechanisms, creating RPOs, and economical coordination is still hazardous.    
The political and institutional dimension give us just as much explanations to path 
dependency observed.  
- Asymetries of power. Power explanations are quite pertinent: strong personal 
imbrications exist between government members and RPOs representants in coffee and milk 
cases. These imbrications have long historical roots in the coffee case (from the early XXth 
century, costarician political elite was dominated by families of coffee industrials and 
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exporters), and are more recent in the cases of milk (1960s). Accession to power seems to be 
facilitated by dominant stakeholder position (CoopeDosPinos in milk, multinational firms in 
pineapple), that tend to maintain power asymetries.  
- Collective nature of politics. Because most of the goods obtained in politics are 
public goods, free riding problems arise (Olson, 1968), and involve high start up costs for a 
policy making oriented RPOs to emerge. The existence of high costs provides evidence for 
organization persistence, as it has been observed in milk and coffee cases.   
- Institutional density. Both milk and coffee sectors have been regulated by numerous 
public policies that have been obtained by the construction of formal institutions (dialogue 
and negociation platforms between State representants and RPOs). Thus, milk and coffee 
policies are grounded in formal institutions, that constraint and guide RPOs’ behavior.  
At the end, both tecnico-economical and politico-institutional factors imply learning 
processes, that include cognitive phenomenons. Nowadays RPOs’ behaviors are grounded in 
the capacities they constructed through experience. These capacities include cognitive17, 
technical, human, and financial factors.   
Pathdependency’s dynamics 
Institutional change dynamics is often described as long periods of gradual change ponctuated 
by short periods of radical changes, and named “dynamics of punctual equilibrium” (Denzau 
and North 1994). In coffee and milk cases, the institutional and organizational dynamics is 
rather continuous: we described the evolution of RPOs’ behaviours as “successes serially 
correlated” (Levinthal and March, 1981); and we showed that RPOs were evoluating through 
a generative learning process: at the same time, RPOs are adapting and participating to 
institutional changes. On the contrary, in bean and pineapple sectors, the institutional and 
organizational dynamics shows discontinuities. In this article, we will limit ourselves to an 
explanation of discontinuities as the result of the application of an external force: this is not a 
satisfactory posture, nevertheless it permits to study RPOs’ reactions to discontinuities. Our 
elements reveal that, faced to institutional changes, RPOs had different reactions : in the case 
of pineapple, RPOs were rather quick to implement adaptive learning process, positioning 
                                                 
17
 The bean example gives us a case where cognitive factors do play a key role in RPOs’ efficiency. The delay 
adjustement we observed is linked with the time RPOs’ leaders took to perceive the gap existing between their 
efforts (revendicative actions against one single actor) and the effects of these efforts (none). The starting point 
of the learning process is that specific point of perception, that implies a modification of mental models (towards 
a more active perception of their role in the process), and the development of new strategies (towards proposal 
and dialogue actions with multiple actors). 
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themselves in the economical game, without trying to act on the national policy making 
elaboration; in the case of bean, RPOs were slower to adapt to changes, but they moved from 
a phase of adaptive learning to a phase of generative learning where they began participating 
to policy processes, trough the creation of a dialogue platform. Partly, differences in mental 
models between bean and pineapple RPOs leaders account for differences in the velocity of 
implementation of learning processes.   
Figure 14 : Dynamics, generative versus adaptive learning processes 
 
 
Conclusion 
In contexts characterized by economical liberalization, rural producers’ organizations can 
guarantee producers’ insertion in dynamic markets, by adaptating to liberalization (marketing 
oriented activities) and even shaping its conditions (policy making oriented activities). We 
showed that RPOs’ policy and economical activities were mutually interdependent : in most 
of the cases, the result of policy activities can be the creation of market incentives.  However, 
the conditions for success of RPOs in ensuring producers insertion in dynamic markets 
depend both on organization’s mental perceptions and resources’ endowment. These 
characteristics are the results of learning processes and directly depend on organizations’ and 
individuals histories. Thus, RPOs successes are in line with pathdependent logic. 
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Appendix 
Figure 15 : Policy making process in the coffee sector 
 
  Figure 16 : Policy making process in the milk sector 
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Figure 17 : Policy  making process in the bean sector 
 
 
Figure 18 : Policy making process in the pineapple sector 
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